While by most accounts the current term of the Supreme Court is generally uninteresting, lacking anything that the popular media deem to be a blockbuster (the media’s choice being same-sex marriage or Affordable Care Act cases), the docket is heavily weighted towards labor and employment cases that potentially affect employers in all industries including retail, health care, financial services, hospitality, and manufacturing. In chronological order of argument they are as follows.
The Court already has heard argument in Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, No. 13-433, which concerns whether the Portal-to-Portal Act, which amends the Fair Labor Standards Act, requires employers to pay warehouse employees for the time they spend, which in this case runs up to 25 minutes, going through post-shift anti-theft screening. Integrity is a contractor to Amazon.com, and the 9th Circuit had ruled in against it, holding that the activity was part of the shift and not non-compensable postliminary activity. Interestingly, DOL is on the side of the employer, fearing a flood of FLSA cases generated from any activity in which employees are on the employers’ premises. This case will affect many of our clients and should be monitored carefully.
On November 10th, the Court will hear argument in M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, No. 13-1010, which I see as an important case, though most commentators don’t seem to realize it. The question involves the so-called “Yard-Man Presumption” in the context of whether the courts should infer that silence as to the duration of retirement health insurance benefits established under a CBA are meant to apply for the lifetimes of covered retirees.
In two other cases involving an issue of discretion and judicial review set for argument on December 1st, Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, No. 13-1041; and Nichols v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, No. 13-1052, the Court will decide whether DOL violated the Administrative Procedure Act by not affording notice-and-comment rulemaking to a reversal of a wage and hour opinion letter issued in 2006. The DC Circuit ruled against DOL in both cases (one in which DOL is the petitioner; another in which affected loan officers are petitioners), rejecting DOL’s contention that the policy change was an “interpretive rule” not subject to APA notice-and-comment strictures. The case at bar itself doesn’t involve much, but as a precedent concerning how free agencies like DOL (a particular worry to employers during this administration), are to regulate unilaterally, free of judicial oversight it will be important, especially in the DC Circuit where there are so many agency cases.
On December 3rd, the Court will hear argument in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 12-1226, which poses whether the Pregnancy Discrimination Act requires an employer to accommodate a pregnant woman with work restrictions related to pregnancy in the same manner as it accommodates a non-pregnant employee with the same restrictions, but not related to pregnancy. The 4th Circuit had ruled in favor of the company, which offered a “light duty program” held to be pregnancy blind to persons who have a disability cognizable under the ADA, who are injured on the job or are temporarily ineligible for DOT certification. Ms. Young objects to being considered in the same category as workers who are injured off the job. This case, too, will create a precedent of interest to at least some of our clients. Of note, last week United Parcel Service sent a memo to employees announcing a change in policy for pregnant workers advising that starting January 1, the company will offer temporary light duty positions not just to workers injured on the job, which is current policy, but to pregnant workers who need it as well. In its brief UPS states “While UPS’s denial of [Young’s] accommodation request was lawful at the time it was made (and thus cannot give rise to a claim for damages), pregnant UPS employees will prospectively be eligible for light-duty assignments.” The change in policy, UPS states, is the result of new pregnancy accommodation guidelines issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and a growing number of states passing laws mandating reasonable accommodation of pregnant workers.
In a case not yet fully briefed or set for argument, Mach Mining LLC v. EEOC, No.13-1019, the Court will decide whether the EEOC’s pre-suit conciliation efforts are subject to judicial review or whether the agency has unreviewable discretion to decide the reasonableness of settlement offers. The Seventh Circuit has ruled in favor of the EEOC in the instant case, but every other Circuit that has considered the matter has imposed a good-faith-effort standard upon the EEOC.
On October 2nd, the Supreme Court granted cert. in a Title VII religious accommodation case, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 14-86. The case concerns whether an employer is entitled to specific notice, in this case of a religious practice – the wearing of a head scarf — from a prospective employee before having the obligation to accommodate her. In this case, the employer did not hire a Muslim applicant. The Tenth Circuit ruled that the employer was entitled to rely upon its “look” policy and would not presume religious bias where the employee did not raise the underlying issue. Retail clients and others will be affected by the outcome.
Finally, also on October 2nd, the Supreme Court granted cert. in Tibble v. Edison Int’l, which raises the issue of whether retirement plan fiduciaries breach their duties under ERISA by offering higher-cost retail-class mutual funds when identical lower-cost institutional class funds are available and the plan fiduciaries initially chose the higher-cost funds as plan investments more than six years (the notional statute of limitations) before the claim was filed. This issue has been around for years and the Court finally will resolve it. The dueling rationales have been discussed in depth on many financial pages, for example recently in the New York Times. The potential importance of the case relates to whether trustees have a separate duty to reconsider their past decisions under a continuing violation theory that would supersede ERISA’s statute of limitations. The Solicitor General, in an amicus brief, argued on behalf of the United States that trustees of ERISA plans owed a continuing duty of prudence, which they breach by failing to research fund options and offer available lower-cost institutional-class investments during the six-year period prior to the filing of the complaint. The Court apparently took the case on the SG’s recommendation that noted the unresolved split on the issue in the Circuits. If the Solicitor General proves correct, and the Petitioner prevails, fiduciaries all across the employment spectrum will be exposed to greater risk of scrutiny for their past actions.
More will follow as developments warrant.